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Abstract
Lowering the standard of negligence below the first-best socially optimal level has
been shown by Ganuza and Gomez (2004) to increase the level of care taken by
judgment proof injurers. In this paper, I consider a more complex model of negli-
gence in which cause in fact is taken into account, and I show that this conclusion
holds when the injurer’s care reduces the magnitude of the accidental harm but
not when the injurer’s care reduces the probability of the accident. Thus, such soft
negligence strategies aimed at tackling the adverse effects of judgment proofness
need to be conditioned to the accident prevention technology available to injurers.
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ABSTRACT 
Lowering the standard of negligence below the first-best socially optimal level has 
been shown by Ganuza and Gomez (2004) to increase the level of care taken by 
judgment proof injurers. In this paper, I consider a more complex model of 
negligence in which cause in fact is taken into account, and I show that this 
conclusion holds when the injurer’s care reduces the magnitude of the accidental 
harm but not when the injurer’s care reduces the probability of the accident. Thus, 
such soft negligence strategies aimed at tackling the adverse effects of judgment 
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1  Introduction 
Ganuza and Gomez (2004) have argued in favor of soft negligence standards for 
judgment proof injurers. They show that lowering the due care standard below the 
first-best socially optimal level1 may actually increase the injurer’s level of care. This 
counterintuitive result can be easily illustrated as follows. Judgment proof injurers 
may find it more convenient to be negligent than to take optimal care because they 
only pay a fraction of the expected damage award and externalize on victims the 
remaining part, which exceeds their assets. Therefore, being negligent costs judgment 
proof injurers less that it costs solvent injurers. 
Reducing the due care level makes it less costly for the injurer to comply with the 
negligence standard and, thus, can counteract the adverse effects of judgment 
proofness. This policy turns out to enhance social welfare since the injurer’s taken 
level of care ends up being closer to the socially optimal level than it would have been 
otherwise. 
Ganuza and Gomez (2004) analyze the standard model of negligence, which does 
not take into account the issue of causation. In this comment, I will expand the 
analysis to encompass cause in fact and show that the outcome is different in this 
case. In particular, I will show that, when cause in fact is considered, there is an 
important difference between situations in which the injurer’s precaution reduces the 
magnitude of the accidental loss – in which case softening the negligence standard is 
an effective policy measure – and situations in which the injurer’s precaution reduces 
the probability of the accident – in which case, contrary to the previous one, softening 
negligence does not increase the injurer’s level of care.2
My results are different from those attained by Ganuza and Gomez because the 
implementation of cause in fact removes the traditionally claimed discontinuity in the 
injurer’s cost function under a negligence rule. Grady (1983) and Kahan (1989) have 
shown that, under the doctrine of cause in fact, a negligent injurer does not 
necessarily pay damages to the victim. The latter must prove that the injurer’s 
negligence caused the harm or, put differently, that the harm would not have occurred 
                                                          
1 Soft negligence is in fact a form of gross negligence. 
2 For the different effects of judgment proofness under different precaution technologies and the distinction 
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but for the negligence of the injurer. In fact, even if the injurer had been non-
negligent, some accidents could have nevertheless occurred since the due care level is 
generally not the level of care that yields a probability of accidents equal to zero. 
Therefore, those accidents that occur even if the injurer is non-negligent need to 
be discounted from the injurer’s expected liability. As a result, the injurer does not 
expect to pay full damages but only incremental damages, that is, the damages caused 
by his negligence. 
Graphical analysis helps illustrating this point. Figure 1 (a) concerns the 
negligence rule without cause in fact.3 The graph depicts a discontinuity in 
correspondence to the due care level x*, which is due to the fact that to the left of x* 
the injurer pays full damages and his precaution cost and to the right of x* he only 
pays his precaution cost. The magnitude of the discontinuity is precisely equal to the 
expected harm that occurs when the injurer takes x*. 
Figure 1 (b) depicts the negligence rule with cause in fact. In this case, there is no 
discontinuity because the damages that would have occurred anyway even at x* need 
to be discounted from the injurer’s liability.4 The expected cost for the negligent 
injurer shifts downward maintaining the original shape and hence its minimization 
point since the subtraction does not affect the cost in marginal terms. 
With solvent injurers, the two rules induce the same levels of precaution; 
however, their outcomes differ in the presence of judgment proofness. While 
precaution under the standard negligence rule can be invariably enhanced by soft 
negligence standards, I will show that the effect of soft negligence in the model with 
cause in fact depends on the precaution technology. 
The standard model assumes that the injurer’s care reduces the probability of 
accidents while the magnitude is exogenously determined – the probability model. In 
reality, however, the injurer’s precaution also has some effects on the magnitude of 
the accidental loss. Reducing the speed, for example, a motorist curbs both the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
between probability and magnitude models, see Dari Mattiacci and De Geest (forthcoming). 
3 See Brown (1973) for the standard economic formalization of tort liability. The straight line represents 
increasing precaution costs, while the decreasing curve represents the expected accident costs (probability of the 
accident times magnitude of the harm), which decrease at a decreasing rate when precaution increases. Their sum 
gives the U shaped curve above the other, only half of which is depicted because the injurer does not pay damages 
when he is non-negligent – that is, to the right of x*. 
4 Those damages are represented by the segment CD, which is equal to the segment AB by construction. In fact the 
segment AD represents the total expected accident costs at x* and is the sum of precaution costs BD and expected 
accident loss CD.  Thus, AB = CD. 
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probability of hitting another car and the magnitude of the resulting harm. For the 
sake of the argument to be made, we will consider a very simple case in which the 
injurer’s care only reduces the magnitude of the harm, while the probability of the 
accident is exogenous – the magnitude model – and compare it with the diametrically 
opposed probability model. 
In the standard negligence model, judgment proofness causes underprecaution 
only if the injurer’s assets are below a certain threshold.5 Figure 2, instead, shows the 
effect of judgment proofness under negligence with cause in fact. Figure 2 (a) depicts 
the probability model, where the dashed line depicts the cost of being negligent for a 
solvent injurer and the continuous line depicts the cost for a judgment proof injurer. 
As the figure shows (the point E is lower than B), it is convenient for the injurer to 
take a level of care below the due socially optimal level as soon as the injurer’s assets 
are below the harm, that is, also for those levels of the injurer’s assets that do not lead 
to underprecaution under the standard model of negligence.6 This is due to the fact 
that injurers only pay incremental damages and hence the cost of violating the due 
care standard is lower than under the traditional negligence rule where they pay full 
damages. Thus, violating is more often convenient than under the standard model of 
negligence. 
If the negligence standard is lowered below x*, then the amount of the damages 
that are to be discounted from the injurer’s liability increases as well since at the new 
level of due care the damages that would have occurred anyway are greater than at the 
optimal level of due care. As a result, the dashed curve moves downward (see the 
gray-bounded line), while maintaining the same shape. Therefore, while the point B – 
the cost of being non-negligent – decreases and moves to the left to become the new 
point B’, the point E – the cost of being negligent – simply moves downwards and 
becomes the new point E’. Again, the injurer’s cost is lower at E’ than at B’. Thus, by 
reducing due care it is impossible to make complying with due care relatively less 
expensive than violating due care. 
In the magnitude model of figure 2 (b) instead, judgment proofness has a 
different effect. Since the probability of the accident is exogenous and the injurer’s 
                                                          
5 See Summers (1983) and Shavell (1986) for this result. 
6 This result is analogous to that derived by Kahan (1989), who does not discuss the issue at stake here but studies 
the effect of an erroneous determination of the damage award when cause in fact is applied in a probability model. 
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care only affects the magnitude of the harm, the injurer is judgment proof only if he 
takes such a low level of precaution that the resulting damages are greater than his 
assets. Thus, as shown in the figure, judgment proofness only affects the left-hand 
region in the graph, corresponding to low levels of x. 
If the injurer takes no precaution, then he pays all his assets only if an accident 
occurs – an expected liability cost depicted by the point F. As he raises his level of 
precaution, the injurer initially bears the same expected liability cost – because, 
despite the fact that precaution reduces the magnitude of the harm, such a harm is so 
large that the injurer still pays all his assets anyway7 – and increasing precaution 
costs. At the point at which the injurer’s precaution is enough to lower the expected 
damages below the value of his assets, his total cost starts decreasing since precaution 
now also reduces his expected liability by reducing the magnitude of the harm. 
It is easy to see that soft negligence affects the point B in the same way as in the 
previous case, but it does not affect the point F, which is independent of the standard 
of due care. Therefore, soft negligence lowers the cost of compliance relative to the 
cost of violating due care and may indeed enhance social welfare. In fact, as in the 
figure, non-negligent behavior at B’ triggers a lower cost than negligent behavior at F. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes the probability model. 
Section 3 analyzes the magnitude model. Section 4  concludes. 
2  The probability model 
In this section, we will analyze situations in which precaution reduces the probability 
of accidents but does not affect the magnitude of the harm. We will formally prove 
the following claims: 
1. In the probability model, under negligence with cause in fact, the injurer 
always takes less than socially optimal precaution if the injurer’s assets 
are less than the harm (while, under negligence without cause in fact, this 
result only obtains if the injurer assets are below a certain threshold); 
2. In the probability model, under negligence with cause in fact, soft 
negligence standards for judgment proof injurers never induce greater 
precaution (while they may do so under negligence without cause in fact). 
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2.1. Judgment proofness under simple negligence with cause in fact in the 
probability model 
Let us examine the behavior of a risk-neutral, wealth-constrained injurer who decides 
his level of precaution in order to minimize the sum of precaution cost and the 
expected liability cost. Accidents are assumed to be of the unilateral-care type; that is, 
only the injurer may take precaution while the victim is passive. Let: 
x = the injurer’s precaution cost, x ≥ 0; 
p(x) = probability of an accident, 0 < p(x) < 1,  p’ < 0,  p” > 0; 
h = magnitude of the harm, h > 0; 
t = the injurer’s assets, t > 0. 
Let us define the social cost as the sum between the expected accident loss and the 
precaution cost, p(x)h + x, and the socially optimal level of precaution x* as the level 
of x that minimizes the social cost and thus solves p’h + 1 = 0. Let us first assume that 
the level of due care is set equal to x*. 
Under simple negligence with cause in fact, the injurer only pays his precaution 
cost if he takes x ≥ x*, and he pays precaution cost and damages if x < x*. In the latter 
case, there are two limitations to his liability. First, if his assets are only t < h, he only 
pays damages up to t if an accident occurs. Second, since cause in fact applies, he 
does not pay damages in those cases in which an accident would have occurred even 
if he had been non-negligent. At x* – when the injurer is non-negligent – a portion 
p(x*) of the accidents occur; thus, those accidents are discounted from the injurer’s 
liability. As a result, the injurer’s cost function is as follows: 
[ ]
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xJ  (1)
The first expression in (1) is minimized by xJP(t), which solves p’t + 1 = 0. Comparing 
this expression with the first order condition for the social optimum, xJP(t) is clearly 
less than x* if t is less than h. Moreover, contrary to what happens under simple 
negligence without cause in fact, the injurer always finds it advantageous to take xJP(t) 
and pay damages rather than to take x* and be free of liability – that is, [p(xJP) – 
p(x*)]t + xJP < x*. In fact, this expression can be rewritten as p(xJP)t + xJP < p(x*)t + 
x*, which is always true because p(x)t + x is minimized by xJP. Therefore, the injurer 
takes a level of precaution xJP(t) < x* for any t < h. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
7 Recall that the probability of accidents is exogenous in a magnitude model. 
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2.2. Soft negligence standards with cause in fact in the probability model 
Let us now imagine that the judge can soften the negligence standard below x* in 
order to induce a judgment proof injurer to increase his level of precaution above xJP. 
Let xSN denote such lower level of due care; by construction, the following 
relationship must hold, xJP < xSN < x* (the welfare-enhancing condition). It is easy to 
see that there exist no xSN that obeys the above relationship and that would be chosen 
by a judgment proof injurer. In fact, an injurer would take xSN instead of xJP only if his 
cost at xSN is less than his cost at xJP (the injurer’s participation condition), that is, if 
[p(xJP) – p(xSN)]t + xJP ≥ xSN, which can be rewritten as p(xJP)t + xJP ≥ p(xSN)t + xSN. As 
we noticed above, since p(x)t + x is minimized by xJP, there exist no xSN ≠ xJP, which 
satisfies this inequality. Therefore, lowering the negligence standard does not induce 
greater injurer’s precaution. 
3  The magnitude model 
In this section, we will analyze accidents in which precaution has no effects on the 
probability of accidents but reduces the magnitude of the harm. We will formally 
prove the following claims: 
1. In the magnitude model, under negligence with cause in fact, if the 
injurer’s assets are below a certain threshold, the injurer takes no 
precaution; he takes due care otherwise (under negligence without cause 
in fact, the same result obtains); 
2. In the magnitude model, under negligence with cause in fact, soft 
negligence standards for judgment proof injurers may induce greater 
precaution (under negligence without cause in fact, the same result 
obtains). 
3.1. Judgment proofness under simple negligence with cause in fact in the 
magnitude model 
Modifying the previous setting, let: 
p = probability of an accident, 0<p<1; 
h(x) = magnitude of the harm, h(x)>0, h’<0, h”>0; h(0)>t. 
The social cost becomes ph(x) + x, and, keeping the same notation as before, the 
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socially optimal level of precaution x* is the level of x that solves ph’ + 1 = 0. 
Under simple negligence with cause in fact, the injurer only pays his precaution 
cost if he takes x ≥ x*, and he pays precaution cost and damages, if x < x*. In the latter 
case, the amount of damages that the injurer pays in the magnitude model differs from 
the probability model. In fact, in a magnitude model, the injurer controls the 
magnitude of the harm and thus runs into insolvency only if he takes such a low level 
of precaution that the resulting damage award overcomes his assets – thus, he pays t.  
Otherwise, if his level of precaution is sufficiently high (although less than x*), the 
damages will be less than his assets, and he will be able to pay for them. As a result, 
the injurer’s cost function is as follows: 
[ ]
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The first expression in (2) has two extrema: xJP = 0 in the left-hand region of the 
graph, when x is such that t < h(x), and x* in the right-hand region of the graph, when 
x is such that t ≥ h(x). According to the negligence rule, if the injurer takes x*, he is 
non-negligent and thus only bears a cost equal to x*. If he takes xJP = 0, he instead 
bears a precaution cost equal to zero and an expected liability cost equal to pt. 
Therefore, the injurer will choose x* only if pt > x* and xJP = 0, otherwise. 
Consequently, the critical threshold for the injurer’s assets below which a potentially 
judgment proof injurer takes less than optimal care – more precisely, he takes no care 
at all – is t = x*/p, which is clearly greater than x*. The same result obtains in the case 
of negligence without cause in fact.8
3.2. Soft negligence standards with cause in fact in the magnitude model 
Unlike in the probability model, judgment proofness reduces the injurer’s care only if 
t < x*/p, and, thus, only in this case may soft negligence be desirable. As above, let us 
now consider the softening of the negligence standard at a level xSN such that the 
injurer, who would otherwise take xJP = 0, takes the new due care level. The soft 
negligence standard xSN hence obeys the following welfare enhancing condition xJP < 
xSN < x*. The injurer will take xSN instead of xJP = 0 only if his cost at xJP is less than 
his compliance cost, that is, if the injurer’s participation condition pt ≥ xSN is 
                                                          
8 For a formal proof of the latter statement, see Dari Mattiacci and De Geest (forthcoming). 
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satisfied. Combining the two conditions and substituting, we obtain 0 < xSN ≤ pt. It is 
easy to see that there always exist such a level of soft negligence xSN as long as t > 0 – 
that is, as long as the injurer has positive assets. Thus, in the magnitude model, 
softening the negligence standard may reduce the social cost. 
4  Conclusion 
Soft negligence is a way to make the due care level dependent on the injurer’s wealth: 
poorer injurers are subject to lower negligence standard in order to counteract the 
adverse effects of judgment proofness. I have shown that, when cause in fact is taken 
into account, the success of soft negligence strategies in increasing the injurer’s level 
of precaution and, hence, enhancing social welfare crucially depends on the 
precaution technology available to the injurer. In a simple model that takes into 
account two opposite stereotypical situations, it has been demonstrated that soft 
negligence does not improve social welfare if the injurer can only reduce the 
probability that an accident occurs – a pure probability model – while it does so if the 
injurer can only reduce the magnitude of the harm – a pure magnitude model. 
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FIGURE 2: Soft negligence with cause in fact in the probability model (a) and in the magnitude model (b) 
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